Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Back-to-Back User Agents (B2BUAs) often act on the media plane, rather than just on the signaling path. This document describes the behavior such B2BUAs can adhere to when acting on the media plane that uses an Secure Real-time Transport (SRTP) security context set up with the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol.
1. Introduction 1.1. Overview [RFC5763] describes how Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] can be used to establish a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) [RFC3711] security context with the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6347] protocol. It describes a mechanism for transporting a certificate fingerprint using Session Description Protocol (SDP) [RFC4566] . The fingerprint, identifies the certificate that will be presented during the DTLS handshake. DTLS-SRTP is defined for pointto-point media sessions, in which there are exactly two participants. Each DTLS-SRTP session (described in Section 3 of [RFC5764] ) contains a single DTLS connection (if RTP and RTCP are multiplexed) or two DTLS connections (if RTP and RTCP are not multiplexed), and either two SRTP contexts (if media traffic is flowing in both directions on the same 5-tuple) or one SRTP context (if media traffic is only flowing in one direction). Ravindranath In many SIP deployments, SIP Back-to-Back User Agents (B2BUA) entities exist on the SIP signaling path between the endpoints. As described in [RFC7092] , these B2BUAs can modify SIP and SDP information. They can also be present on the media path, in which case they modify parts of the SDP information (like IP address, port) and subsequently modify the RTP headers as well. Such B2BUAs are referred to as media plane B2BUAs.
Goals
[RFC7092] describes two different categories of media plane B2BUAs, according to the level of activities performed on the media plane:
A B2BUA that acts as a simple media relay effectively unaware of anything that is transported and only terminates the media plane at the IP and transport (UDP/TCP) layers.
A B2BUA that performs a media-aware role. It inspects and potentially modifies RTP headers or RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) packets.
The following sections describe the behavior B2BUAs MUST follow in order to avoid any impact to end-to-end DTLS-SRTP sessions.
Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The following generalized terms are defined in [RFC3261] , Section 6.
B2BUA: a SIP Back-to-Back User Agent, which is the logical combination of a User Agent Server (UAS) and User Agent Client (UAC).
UAS: a SIP User Agent Server.
UAC: a SIP User Agent Client.
All of the pertinent B2BUA terminology and taxonomy used in this document is based on [RFC7092] . [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] provides a means for signing portions of SIP requests in order to provide identity assurance and certificate pinning by providing a signature over the fingerprint of keying material in SDP for DTLS-SRTP [RFC5763] . A media relay B2BUA MUST ensure that it does not modify any of the information used to construct the signature.
In the above example, Alice can be authorized by the authorization server (SIP proxy) in its domain using the procedures in Section 5 of [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]. In such a case, if the B2BUA modifies some of the SIP headers or SDP content that was used by Alice's authorization server to generate the identity, it would break the identity verification procedure explained in Section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] resulting in a 438 error response being returned.
RTP/RTCP-aware Media Aware B2BUA
Unlike the media relay discussed in Section 3.1.1, a media-aware relay as defined in Section 3.2.2 of [RFC7092] , is aware of the type of media traffic it is receiving. There are two types of media-aware relay, those that merely inspect the RTP headers and RTCP packets, and those that inspect and modify the RTP headers and RTCP packets. The mechanism described in Security Considerations section MUST be used by endpoint to detect malicious B2BUA's that MAY attempt to terminate the DTLS-SRTP session. In order to modify headers a B2BUA needs to act as a DTLS endpoint and terminate the DTLS-SRTP session and decrypt/re-encrypt RTP payload. This would break end-to-end security and hence a B2BUA MUST NOT terminate DTLS-SRTP session. This security and privacy problem can be mitigated by having different keys for protecting RTP header integrity and encrypting the RTP payload. For example, the approach discussed in [I-D.jones-perc-private-media-reqts] can be used. With such an approach, the B2BUA is not aware of the keys used to decrypt the media payload.
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Media Plane B2BUA with NAT Handling
DTLS-SRTP handshakes and SDP offer/answer exchanges [RFC3264] may happen in parallel. If an endpoint is behind a NAT, and the endpoint is acting as a DTLS server, the ClientHello message from a B2BUA (acting as DTLS client) is likely to be lost, as described in Section 7.3 of [RFC5763] . In order to overcome this problem, the endpoint and B2BUA can support the Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) mechanism [RFC5245] , as discussed in Section 7.3 of [RFC5763] . If the ICE check is successful then the endpoint will receive the ClientHello message from the B2BUA.
Forking Considerations
Due to forking [RFC3261], a SIP request carrying an SDP offer sent by an endpoint (offerer) can reach multiple remote endpoints. As a result, multiple DTLS-SRTP sessions can be established, one between the endpoint that sent the SIP request and each of the remote endpoints that received the request. Both media relays and mediaaware relays MUST forward the certificate fingerprints and SDP setup attributes it received in the SDP answer from each endpoint (answerer) unmodified towards the offerer. Since DTLS operates on the 5-tuple, B2BUA MUST replace the answerer's transport addresses in each answer with its unique transport addresses so that the offerer can establish a DTLS connection with each answerer. 
Security Considerations
This document describes the behavior media plane B2BUAs (media-aware and media-unaware) MUST follow when acting on the media plane that uses SRTP security context setup with the DTLS protocol. Attempting to cover media-aware relay modifying RTP headers and media termination scenarios involving secure sessions (like DTLS-SRTP) will inevitably lead to the B2BUA acting as a man-in-the-middle, and hence a B2BUA MUST NOT terminate DTLS-SRTP session. This document does not introduce any specific security considerations beyond those detailed in [RFC5763] . In addition, the B2BUA behaviors outlined in this document do not impact the security and integrity of a DTLS-SRTP session or the data exchanged over it. A malicious B2BUA MAY try to break into the DTLS connection, but such an attack can be prevented using the identity validation mechanism discussed in [RFC4474] and getting updated in [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]. Either the endpoints
